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Abstract 
Ethics and leadership are vital to any organisation. Within the intelligence community leaders 
have an unquestionable role in the security of a nation and often deal with disturbing 
information and sometimes operate in personal danger to obtain valuable information. In 
some instances, unethical tactics (such as stealing or eavesdropping on an unsuspected 
conversation) are used to obtain information on potential national threats. In an ordinary life 
eavesdropping on someone else’s conversation or hacking into their computer would be 
considered a serious breach of courtesy and/or social convention. However, in the 
intelligence world, unethical tactics are necessary to protect nations and the people living 
within them. The purpose of this paper is to investigate ethics and intelligence and the role 
leadership plays. The paper begins by exploring the key elements of intelligence and the 
different methods of collecting information. Next, the paper outlines the three main 
approaches to ethics and how they can be applied to intelligence agencies. Then, the role of 
leadership in ethics and intelligence services is explored. Finally, the paper concludes with a 
discussion surrounding the difficulty in researching ethics, intelligence and leadership in 
intelligence agencies. 
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Introduction 
Intelligence as a form of statecraft is a far from new phenomenon and is regarded as 
one of the world’s oldest professions (Hulnick & Mattausch, 1989; Jones, 2010; Nolte, 2009). 
There is a long list of historical evidence that suggests intelligence has been around for 
thousands of years. The Bible has various passages about the use of intelligence and there are 
suggestions that the Babylon Tablets comprise elements relating to spying (Hulnick & 
Mattausch, 1989). Even well known historical events contain traces of some type of 
intelligence. The Lewis and Clark expedition, for example, is primarily known as one of 
exploration; however, their mission was also to collect intelligence for the United States of 
America (USA), which would be helpful for the growth and expansion of the nation (Nolte, 
2009). In the modern world intelligence gathering has increased significantly in response to 
demands that impact national security (especially following September 11, 2001 (9/11)) such 
as countering espionage, people smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and is now an inescapable necessity (Cornall & Black, 2011).  
 
Due to the nature of the profession, intelligence officers obtain information using both 
overt operations (information is public) and/or covert operations (information is not public). 
Intelligence professionals around the world are taught and encouraged by their leaders and 
agencies to use unethical tactics or “tradecraft” (e.g. lie, deceive, steal, and manipulate) in 
order to obtain this information. Even so, some of these operations breach ethical standards, 
sometimes even resulting in human rights being taken away (Herman, 2010). These practices 
would be considered unethical and illegal if practiced in everyday life; however, in the 
intelligence world they are ethically acceptable when national security is at risk (Hulnick & 
Mattausch, 1989).   
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Over the last few years there have been several controversial cases (especially those 
involving suspected terrorists) that underline the need for more ethical guidelines surrounding 
intelligence practices. One of the most published examples is the detention of Binyam 
Mohamed at Guantanamo Bay (Townsend, 2009). While detained, Mohamed admitted that 
he trained in the al-Qaeda terrorist training camp. However, these charges were later dropped 
by the USA because the evidence against him was obtained by using extreme, inhumane 
torture techniques (Bellaby, 2012; Townsend, 2009). This is also apparent for much of the 
Bush administration and the hunt for Osama Bin Ladin. The issue of torture and the 
legitimate treatment of individuals suspected of terrorist activities has been at the forefront of 
discussions, leading a number of countries to investigate national intelligence services and 
the way in which political leaders have handled intelligence through special and 
parliamentary inquiries (Anderson, 2001; Bellaby, 2012; Born & Wetzling, 2009). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate ethics and intelligence and the role 
leadership plays in ethical decision making. The paper explores the key elements of 
intelligence and the different methods of collecting information. The paper outlines the three 
main theoretical approaches to ethics and how they can be applied to intelligence 
organisations. It examines the role of leadership in ethics and intelligence services, before 
concluding with a discussion surrounding the difficulty of researching ethics, intelligence and 
leadership in intelligence organisations. 
 
Intelligence and counter-intelligence defined 
Prior to 9/11 the relationship between intelligence and ethics was very limited (Omand 
& Phythian, 2013). Post 9/11 the literature on intelligence and ethics has developed 5 
 
significantly; however, there are still areas that lack a comprehensive understanding. One of 
the main drawbacks in this field is that there is no conscenus on the definition of intelligence.  
At the broadest level intelligence is both a process and a product and can be defined as either 
“the means it was obtained” (e.g. intelligence being covertly obtained information without the 
authority of the group who owns the information) or by the “outcomes” it makes possible 
(e.g. intelligence being the collection and processing of information about foreign countries 
for a government’s foreign policy and national security) (Bimfort, 1995; Cornall & Black, 
2011; Flood, 2004). Herman (2010) defines intelligence as “information and information 
gathering, not doing things to people; no one gets hurt by it, at least not directly” (p. 342). 
However, as Omand and Phythian (2013) acknowledge the post 9/11 era has shown that 
intelligence collection not only involves doing things to people, but also involves hurting 
people in the process. 
 
From a narrower security perspective, an independent review of the intelligence 
community by Cornall and Black (2011) defines intelligence as “information that enables you 
to protect your interests or to maintain a valuable advantage in advancing your interests over 
those posing threats to them” (p. 6). This definition is quite broad and focuses only on the 
outcome, which is national security. While debate continues over the definition of 
intelligence there does seem to be a consensus among scholars that intelligence involves 
information, regardless of the purpose and types of methods used to obtain it (Turner, 1990).  
 
Another type of intelligence is called counter-intelligence (CI). CI is an activity 
dedicated to collecting information for one’s own nation against espionage and sabotage 
(Turner, 1990). Collecting information on potential national security threats is not an easy 
task. It involves a large amount of human resources and the most up-to-date technology. Then 6 
 
again, even with the most sophisticated software and experts in the intelligence field there 
have been major events in history where information collected was misunderstood or 
misinterpreted (Bar-Joseph, 2010). The attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, and 
similarly the 9/11 attacks by al-Qaeda for example are known as complete intelligence 
blunders (Bar-Joseph, 2010; Wohlstetter, 1962).  
 
Nature of intelligence work 
Intelligence work consists mainly of the collection and analysis of information that is 
generally available to anyone with the right resources (Quinlan, 2007).  Generally, the first 
stage of intelligence is utilising open source material. For example, intelligence officers “read 
books, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, attend academic conferences, and exchange 
views with people in the know” (Turner, 1990, p. 289). When information is not publically 
available, intelligence officers use a variety of methods to collect intelligence: 1) Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) which is the interception of foreign communications; 2) Geospatial 
Intelligence (GEOINT) which is derived from the collection and analysis of images and 
geospatial information (physical information in the form of maps or three-dimensional virtual 
representations of landscapes, etc.) about the features and events with reference to location 
and time (Cornall & Black, 2011, p. 7); and 3) Human Intelligence (HUMINT), which is the 
direct, personal involvement of intelligence officers with another person who has been 
recruited or has volunteered to betray their own government (Nolte, 2009).   
 
Even though HUMINT is the most common method used, all three are utilised to build 
a stronger understanding of the information obtained. Within the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), HUMINT is relied on to obtain information that is not normally available through 
other sources (Turner, 1990). In this instance, the CIA employs case officers who recruit 7 
 
foreign nationals to gain access to information as well as help with understanding the 
information (Turner, 1990).  
 
When information is not easily accessible it is obtained through covert operations, such 
as eavesdropping, cracking codes, intercepting private communications, observing activities 
that would be preferred to be unobserved, and interrogation (Quinlan, 2007). For example, 
during the Bush administration’s war on terrorism, any intelligence about the enemy (even 
that gained through unethical interrogation techniques) was considered necessary to protect 
the American people (Vest, 2005).  An example of such interrogation methods is where 
“terror suspects overseas are kidnapped and delivered to third-party countries for 
interrogation – which, not uncharacteristically, includes some measure of torture and 
sometimes fatal torture” (Vest, 2005, p. 3651). There are some scholars who support and 
endorse the argument that “torture [sometimes] works” (Bagaric & Clark, 2005; Posner & 
Vermeule, 2005). These scholars believe that when torture is used for informational purposes 
to unveil a potential threat to national security its use is therefore morally justifiable (Welsh, 
2010/2011). Bowen (2003) states “like any sensitive person, I don’t relish the idea of 
inflicting pain on someone, or making someone miserable. But by the same token, if you can 
save lives – if people are plotting mass murder and you have a chance of preventing it – it’s 
hard to argue against whatever methods work” (p. 4). Bowen (2003) also goes on to argue 
that gathering intelligence information by means of psychological manipulation may be more 
effective than by physical manipulation or torture. 
 
However, there have also been well documented cases by the media into the US 
Government’s interrogation practices and many former CIA officers have spoken out about 
how these techniques are simply just wrong (Vest, 2005). Burton L. Gerber, a former CIA 8 
 
agent after 39 years of service has spoken out saying that he opposes torture “because it 
corrupts the society that tolerates it”. Gerber’s reasoning is “that a standard is changed, and 
that new standard that’s acceptable is less than what our nation should stand for. I think the 
standards in something like this are crucial to the identity of America as a free and just 
society” (Vest, 2005, p. 3651). Gerber further states that “torture almost always fails to yield 
true or useful information; it has the potential to adversely affect CIA operations” (Vest, 
2005, p. 3651).  
 
In an ordinary life, if you were to hack into someone else’s computer or torture them to 
obtain information this would be a serious breach of privacy and be illegal (Quinlan, 2007). 
Whether intelligence officers gather intelligence that is available to anyone or obtain it in a 
covert manner they must still operate within an ethical framework (Quinlan, 2007). Together, 
intelligence professionals and representatives from the policy agencies need to attempt to 
weigh competing requirements, assess the availability of relevant open source material, and 
operate in some type of ethical realm.  
 
Ethical approaches  
There are three main approaches to studying ethics in the current literature: realism, 
consequentialism, idealism and “just war” or “just intelligence” theory. 
 
According to the realist approach, intelligence activities are justified if they serve the 
well-being of the state and rest on the “moral duty of the sovereign to protect her subjects” 
(Gill, 2009, p.89). Thinking such as Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes advocates 
realism (Jones, 2010). According to Hobbes, governments are entitled to “do anything” that 
seems necessary to protect national security (Erskine, 2004). Therefore, nothing is really off 9 
 
limits for governments wanting to gather information from abroad, especially in times of war 
(Jones, 2010). On the same level, nations have no inherent right of privacy against other 
nations during peacetime (Herman, 2010). From a realist perspective, when an intelligence 
officer engages in what would be considered unethical behaviour (e.g. lie, cheat, blackmail, 
etc.) these actions are not considered unethical because they are all necessary for national 
security (Jones, 2010). 
 
The consequentialist approach is more concerned with the ends rather than the means 
and judges actions by the value of their consequences (Jones, 2010). It also does not advocate 
an “anything goes” policy; it is dependent on the ends outweighing the means (Jones, 2010). 
According to the consequentialist approach “intelligence activities will be acceptable if they 
maximize the good through balancing the benefits of increased knowledge against the costs 
of how it might have been acquired” (Gill, 2009, p.89). However, the definition of what is 
considered a “good outcome”, as Jones (2010) points out, depends on who it is good for. 
 
The third approach to ethics is idealism or deontologicalism. This approach is based on 
the work by Kant, where morality is regarded as an absolute (e.g. “Thou shalt not kill”) 
without any exception and where “people must be treated as ends in themselves, not as tools” 
(Gill, 2009, p. 90; Jones, 2010, p. 23). According to this approach, some of the methods used 
to collect intelligence (such as deception and theft in covert operations) are considered 
morally unethical (Gendron, 2004). To satisfy this approach, only publicly available 
information would be acceptable. The current collection methods used by intelligence 
agencies (e.g. any covert operations) would be deemed unacceptable. However, if this was 
actually implemented into today’s world many nations would fail to protect their national 
security as most information can only be obtained through covert operations. However, as 10 
 
Hobbes observes, without some form of covert intelligences “sovereigns can have no more 
idea what orders need to be given for the defence of their subjects than spiders can know 
when to emerge and where to make for without the threads of their webs” (cited in Erskine, 
2004, p. 304). In the end, realism and idealism are on the complete opposite ends of the scale. 
Both of these approaches attempt to distinguish all moral questions into a black or white 
category (Jones, 2010). 
 
The final approach is the “just war”, also known as the “just intelligence” approach, 
and is commonly accepted as the most reasonable way of addressing the ethics–intelligence 
dilemma. This approach is based on “structured reasoning” (Gill, 2009, p. 90) and is used:  
 
to distinguish between the conditions under which an object can justly be targeted 
by an intelligence agency (jus ad intelligentiam) and the manner in which 
intelligence agents and entities conduct themselves thereafter (jus in intelligentia), 
in much the same way as classic Just War theory distinguishes between just 
causes of war (jus ad bellum) and the just conduct of war (jus in bello). (Omand & 
Phythian, 2013, p. 42)  
 
For example, at times of war, military professions are exempt from ordinary laws (e.g. 
they have the right to use covert methods to obtain information from a national threat and 
also have the right to kill). As Jones (2010) acknowledges, outside times of war these 
professionals would be considered liars and murderers.  
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It is important to remember that intelligence gathering is a constant state and as the 
former Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, expresses, “while a nation is at 
peace...we in intelligence are constantly at war” (cited in Lathrop, 2004, p. 205).  
 
Leadership and ethics 
The study of ethics is all about human relationships and how we behave in the different 
roles we play, this includes the role of leaders (Ciulla, 2004). To Geoffrey Harpham, ethics is 
simply “the site of a desire for a clean conscience” (Harpham, 1999, p. xiii). According to 
Trevino (1986) ethics is a code of values, moral principles and behaviours (acceptable and 
unacceptable) that guides an individual’s behaviour as to what is right from what is wrong. 
Regardless of how you define ethics, it is important that context is understood to play a 
critical role in determining between normative ethics (e.g. what one should do) and 
descriptive ethics (e.g. what one actually decides to does) (Whatley, 2012).  
 
Leadership is vital to any organisation and plays a key role in the culture and ethical 
standards within an organisation (Plinio, 2009). A good leader needs to behave in ways that 
influence the behaviour of their followers (Plinio, 2009). They must also provide direction 
and assess the needs and expectations of their followers in order to influence them to work 
towards the vision and benefit of the organisation (Kangungo & Mendonca, 2012). They 
must have a deep understanding of the core values and that all of the rules assumed as a 
leader “need to be founded or rooted in some solid commitments: to common ethical values; 
to the voice of professional convictions; to your personal conscience; and to your 
professional and social constraints (codes)” (Donlevy & Walker, 2011, p. 19). The greatest 
strength and the greatest weakness of leaders is that they are all human beings and therefore 12 
 
at times can act as “unpredictable creatures, capable of extra-ordinary kindness and cruelty” 
(Ciulla, 2005, p. 1). 
 
Many authors agree that ethics is an important aspect of leadership (Burns, 1978; 
Ciulla, 2004; Thompson, 2000; Yukl, 2012). It has been further argued that ethics and ethical 
decision-making are the heart of leadership (Ciulla, 2004. Ethical leadership can be as simple 
as a “matter of leaders having a good character” (Freeman & Stewart, 2006, p. 2). However, 
ethical leadership is not as simple as “do the right thing” or “if you talk the talk, and walk the 
walk” (Plinio, 2009, p.278). As Trevino, and Brown put it:  
 
the ethical decision-making process involves multiple stages that are fraught with 
complications and contextual pressures. Individuals may not have the cognitive 
sophistication to make the right decision. And most people will be influenced by 
peers’ and leaders’ words and actions, and by concerns about the consequences of 
their behavior in the work environment. (200, p. 71)  
 
Ethical leadership is therefore defined as “the demonstration of normatively appropriate 
conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such 
conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement and decision-making” 
(Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2005, p. 120). 
 
The commitment of intelligence officers and their leaders has an unquestionable role in 
the security of a nation. Intelligence officers work under the stress of a great responsibility 
and often deal with disturbing information and sometimes operate in personal danger to 
obtain valuable information. Intelligence professionals around the world are taught and 13 
 
encouraged by their leaders to use unethical tactics (such as lie, deceive, and steal) in order to 
obtain such information. Ethical standards may be breached if applied to the real world. 
However, in the world of intelligence it is a necessity to partake in unethical practices in 
order to protect a nation and the people within in it. Overall, leadership has a significant role 
in producing ethical or unethical practice within any organisation, including any intelligence 
agency. 
 
The difficulty with intelligence, ethics and leadership, and recommendations 
There are many difficulties in studying intelligence, ethics and leadership. The main 
hurdle is the secrecy surrounding the intelligence community. This secrecy is a necessity for 
any country, especially when it comes to national security, yet it makes it extremely difficult 
to understand the specific activies that intelligence officers engage in (Born & Wills, 2010). 
There is also a lack of public information regarding the standards in intelligence (Born & 
Wills, 2010). The “task before intelligence agencies now is to build higher fences around 
fewer secrets, limiting protection only to sources and methods that merit it, while disclosing 
as much as possible of everything else”(Gries, 2007, p. 2). Although there has been a good 
start in reducing secrecy within the intelligence community (e.g. the CIA provides a variety 
of unclassified maps and reference documents both to the intelligence community and the 
public), it is unrealistic to assume that intelligence agencies will eventually be completely 
open and transparent and therefore they will continue to make it difficult to fully understand 
all the dynamics of intelligence and CI. 
 
The second hurdle is leadership in an environment which is unstable, ever changing and 
complex; thereby making being an intelligence leader extremely difficult and demanding. An 
intelligence officer’s career is far from conventional and faces a number of ethical 14 
 
considerations that are not typical to other professions (Hudson, 2010). The intelligence 
community is also regulated by domestic and international law which makes it difficult to 
establish laws and rules which are put in place for every conceivable situation (Born & Wills, 
2010).  
 
Many intelligence agencies are large bureaucracies, where the staff function within a 
hierarchy and where responsibility can fragment (Erskine, 2001). It is therefore imperative 
that specific ethical guidelines are available to these officers to help deal with ethical 
dilemmas (Hudson, 2010). Many academics and intelligence professionals agree and have 
called for a more coherent ethical framework (Bellaby, 2012).  
 
Hudson (2010) points out that there is already language in effect to various policy 
documents within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), but none have 
been consolidated into a single ethical guidance document. Hudson (2010) suggests that the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules, used by attorneys, can be used as a 
foundation for an ethical guide. Some examples of the ABA Model Rules are: treating one’s 
profession as an ethical pursuit; placing one’s professional role within a broader social and 
political framework; proffering specific guidance on issues particular to a given profession; 
binding the entirety of practitioners to make competence and expertise the primary 
qualification, rather than ethical flexibility, and ensuring the integrity of the profession 
through dedicated disciplinary processes (cited in Hudson, 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
To some the terms ethics and intelligence may be considered a contradiction of terms 
(Godfrey, 1978) and to others there is simply no place for ethics in intelligence (Gill, 2009). 15 
 
According to Duane R. Clarridge, a CIA officer for over 30 years, “Depending on where 
you’re coming from, the whole business of espionage is unethical … intelligence ethics is an 
oxymoron. It’s not an issue. It never was and never will be, not if you want a real spy 
service” (cited in Gill, 2009, p. 89). However, intelligence is deep-rooted in many core 
ethical principles, such as telling the truth and the sole purpose of intelligence is to provide 
policymakers with a close and accurate depiction of a given situation (Godfrey, 1978). But in 
fact, finding out the truth about a situation is rarely a simple fact and is almost always a 
combination of fact and judgement (Godfrey, 1978).  There are not necessarily any right 
answers to ethical questions about intelligence, nor can issues relating to ethical intelligence 
be classified as black or white (Jones, 2010). Intelligence is a necessary and valuable tool to 
all nations and it is therefore important that we gain a more comprehensive and coherent 
understanding of the role of ethics in intelligence and how leadership helps facilitate this role. 
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